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Lehrende: Dr. Michael Oliva Cordoba
Veranstaltungsart:
Hauptseminar
Anzeige im Stundenplan:
Semesterwochenstunden:
2
Credits:
4,0
Unterrichtssprache:
Englisch
Min. | Max. Teilnehmerzahl:
5 | 25
Kontingentschema: Phil_Standard_WS1415
Weitere Informationen:
Für den erfolgreichen Besuch dieser Veranstaltung im Rahmen des Fachspezifischen Wahlbereichs werden 4 LP angerechnet.
Kommentare/ Inhalte:
There is a famous quote of Isaiah Berlin’s which captures a widespread sentiment: “Equality needs no reasons, only inequality does so”. Why exactly is this statement appealing? And what is it ultimately about? Luckily, we are helped with an example: „If I have a cake and there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one tenth to each, this will not, at any rate automatically, call for justification; whereas if I depart from this principle of equal division I am expected to produce a special reason.“ What makes Berlin’s idea plausible is reference to the way we treat people. It concerns the way we treat those among whom the cake is divided. It does not, however, draw on equality in the sense most often applied in present-day discussions. It does not address whether people are different, or whether they should be made equal. Here lies an important distinction. There can be good reasons to treat people as equals who are patently different. These reasons need by no means be reasons for levelling the respective differences. A good case in point is the promise of equality before the law. It reminds us, among other things, to treat men and women, the young and the old, the rich and the poor, etc., with the same prospect of justice. It is not a call to arms to make differences in sex, age, or wealth disappear. What justifies treating people as equals may be quite different from what would justify making them equal. Treating people as equals will even often carry the implication that they are not. Taken at face value, this gives rise to some considerations perhaps uncommon in our times. For if you look at it the condition man is born into is ambivalent:
On the one hand it is one of poverty, want, and ignorance. Left to itself the newborn infant will quickly perish. So, what calls for explanation is not: Why is there poverty? Why want? Why ignorance? Rather, it is how man manages to lift himself out of the meagre circumstances he finds himself being thrown into. This, one could argue, is the topic of human progress. On the other hand, the condition man is born into is one of inequality, diversity, and difference. It is a myth long debunked that raised under the exact same circumstances two given newborn infants will grow to become virtually indistinguishable persons. Nature itself sees to it that no two persons are exactly alike: We enter this world as individuals. Hence, what calls for explanation is not: Why is there inequality? Why diversity? Why difference? Rather, it is why and to what extent we should produce equality or diminish diversity, and whether the exigencies of difference can be reconciled with a world thought of as constituted by peers, and if so, how. This one could term the topic of human flourishing. There seem to be two types of aspects to the human condition. , and this would explain why it is ambivalent: In order to live a good life there are hardships to overcome and opportunities to seize. Poverty, one might say, is among the former. Diversity, I would claim, is among the latter.
Nowadays, all thinking about equality seems deeply embedded in thinking about morality. Friends of equality will often claim that it is a moral good; sometimes it is even treated as a good in itself. Proponents of such an approach find support in Jean-Jacques Rousseau who, after all, describes many evils which plague man as „the inseparable consequences of nascent inequality“. For some it must come as a surprise that from a thoroughly moral point of view it is very well possible to argue for the exact opposite. With regard to the widespread idea of economic equality this was done by Princeton philosopher Harry Frankfurt. All genuine moral concern must reveal, he says, that (economic) equality is morally irrelevant: „How [man] compares with others is surely not what it is fundamentally important for him to care about.“ Economic equality is even dangerous if adopted as a moral ideal: It „tends to divert a person’s attention away from endeavouring to discover—within his experience of himself and of his life—what he himself really cares about.“ Therefore, „exaggerating the moral importance of economic equality is harmful […] because it is alienating.“ A generation ago, when Frankfurt mounted his individualistic challenge against a communitarian perspective (which may be even more prevalent today) these were thought provoking ideas indeed. However, in contemporary discussion these ideas seem to have vanished without a trace. If we want to rescue a potentially seminal debate from oblivion we must start from scratch and question our commitment to conceptions which have become so popular that we simply take them for granted. Perhaps this will comprise reconciling respect for the individual with respect for the commonwealth. But in any case it will bring to light that there is a side to the ensuing debate which unavoidably points to political philosophy. Also, it is apt to have far-reaching implications for applied issues in many important fields.
The course will be held in English. Participation does not require any special prerequisites. Students of the master’s programme in Politics, Economics, and Philosophy (M.Sc. PEP) are welcome. Course requirements are regular attendance, active participation, an open mind, and academic civility. The course will be held weekly via ZOOM at the time scheduled in STiNE. There will be no auxiliary side elements (like, e.g., Agora oder Commsy).
Also, please mind the fine print:
- A ZOOM link will be sent via STiNE to those students admitted by STiNE. The link is confidential and must not be distributed or made accessible to third parties.
- All participants must be entitled to participate at all times. In order to avoid unauthorised participation (aka ZOOM bombing) there will be a mandatory identification procedure at the beginning at each session.
- It is sufficient for identification purposes to log in with you camera turned on and with your screen name matching your name as recorded by STiNE.
- Please bear in mind that once your camera has been switched off and your screen name no longer matches your name as recorded by STiNE it will not be possible to distinguish you from an unauthorised participant (which, according to cf. 7. (below), must be excluded from participation).
- Participation with camera switched off and with a screen name not matching your name as recorded by STiNE is still possible. However, in this case you are required to contact me early enough to discuss and agree upon alternative methods of identification.
- Sustaining ultra posse nemo obligatur, failure to ask for alternative methods of identification and reach an agreement upon such methods timely before the respective class will nullify a possible objection to exclusion from class conclusively. The burden of proof for the existence of such an agreement and the student’s complying with it is upon the student.
- If a participant’s entitlement to take part in class cannot be determined, the participant must be excluded from participation. Please contact me soon enough to avoid an unwanted exclusion.
- Finally, do not forget that nobody likes to discuss with a a name tag or a blank screen. The point of convening via ZOOM is to talk, discuss, and work with each other as if we were in class and there were no pandemic.
So: Stay cheerful, healty, and safe. See you soon!
Literatur:
- Anderson, Elizabeth (1999), “What is the point of equality?”, Ethics 109, 287–337.
- Arneson, Richard (1989), “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”, Philosophical Studies 56, 77–93.
- Berlin, Isaiah (1999), “Equality”, Concepts and categories, London: Pimlico, 81–102.
- Cohen, Gerald Allen (1989), „On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice“, Ethics 99, 906–944.
- Frankfurt, Harry (1987), „Equality as a Moral Ideal“, Ethics 98, 21–43.
- –––––––– (2000), „The moral irrelevance of equality“, Public Affairs Quarterly 14, 87–103.
- Miller, David (1997), “Equality and Justice”, Ratio 10, 222–237.
- Nagel, Thomas (1979), “Equality”, Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 106–127.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1755), „Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men“, in: Gourevitch, Victor (ed.), The discourses and other early political writings, Cambridge 1997: Cambridge University Press.
- Scanlon, Thomas M. (2018), Why Does Inequality Matter?, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sen, Amartya (1992), Inequality Reexamined, Oxford: Oxford: University Press
- –––––––– (1997), On economic inequality. Expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sowell, Thomas (1999), „The Mirage of Equality“, in: The Quest for Cosmic Justice, New York: Touchstone Books, 49–96.
- –––––––– (2019), Discrimination and Disparities, revised edition, New York: Basic Books.
- Temkin, Larry (1993), Inequality, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Westen, Peter (1982), “The empty idea of equality”, Harvard Law Review 95, 537–
- Williams, Bernard (1973), “The idea of equality”, Problems of the Self, 230–249.
Zusätzliche Hinweise zu Prüfungen:
Studienleistungen:
- aktive Teilnahme
- sorgfältige Vor-/Nachbereitung der Seminarsitzung
- weitere Studienleistungen werden ggf. am Anfang der Veranstaltung bekannt gegeben
Prüfungsleistung:
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