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Lehrende: Dr. Michael Oliva Cordoba
Veranstaltungsart:
Hauptseminar
Anzeige im Stundenplan:
Semesterwochenstunden:
2
Credits:
4,0
Unterrichtssprache:
Englisch
Min. | Max. Teilnehmerzahl:
1 | 25
Kontingentschema: Phil_Standard_WS1415
Weitere Informationen:
Für den erfolgreichen Besuch dieser Veranstaltung im Rahmen des Fachspezifischen Wahbereichs werden 4 LP angerechnet.
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Kommentare/ Inhalte:
By and large, (philosophical) action theory is in quite good shape. Like in all scientific disciplines there are controversies and difficulties, but there is also a solid consensus as to the phenomena to be explained, there are paradigmatic theories constantly being made reference to, and there are classic contributions providing starting points for old insights and new debates. So is quite safe to conclude that as a scientific discipline action theory is a decent, well-established, and worthwhile field of study in its own right.
The situation seems different with the study of human action in the practical disciplines and the social sciences. In economics, for example, there is the famous rant of 20th century luminary Paul Samuelson that the study of human action in economics gives “reason to tremble for the reputation” of the subject. How can this be if economics is, as Alfred Marshall famously stated, “a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life” and an examination “of individual and social action”?
Considering that the explanandum of economic theory is economic action it would seem that an enquiry into the nature of action in general must have a strong bearing on the more specific domain. The course aims at making good on that assumption by delineating from scratch how a substantial and in no way marginal conception in economic theory may fundamentally benefit from insights drawn entirely from a unbiased and general understanding originating in (philosophical) action theory, properly understood.
II
The field of application concerns the central concept of competition. Usually accounted for in the popular equilibrium picture of (perfect) competition, it has been noted for some time now that there remains something important missing:
"The popularity of the concept of perfect competition in theoretical economics is as great today as it has ever been. [however, the] limitations of the concept in dealing with conditions of persistent and imperfectly predicted change will not be removed until economics possesses a developed theory of change." (Stigler 2008, 8)
What is being left out is precisely what action theory is all about: The (economic) agent. Thus, action theory can help putting him back in.
Oddly enough, economists themselves point to the fact that originally the agent did occupy a central position in the understanding of the term: “Competition entered economics from common discourse, and for long it connoted only the independent rivalry of two or more persons.” Rivalry, however, can be fully accounted for making use of action theory and the philosophy of mind only. The course explores in which way this can be done and what the theoretical and practical implications of such an approach would be.
To this end the course will proceed as follows: After a general introduction basics of both action theory and the philosophy of mind are sketched. On basis of this we shall turns towards an action theoretic restatement of the concept of competition. Finally, implications for theory and policy are explored.
III
In order to provide rigorous and unbiased foundations, the basic concepts of action theory are not left to “top down” theorising but are derived “bottom up” using the methodological tool of variation: Theoretical linguists are used to substituting expressions for one another and deriving functional categories, grammatical classes and the like. Applying the same method to real-life action reports yields four functional categories: Agent, doing, wanting, and believing. Also, going back to natural language action reports ultimately reveals their canonical form:
(CF) x f-s because x wants that p and x believes that if x f-s then p
Note that on a natural understanding what is cited after the word “because” describes the respective agent’s reason. It does so by attributing a conjunction of propositional attitudes. Thus, acting is inextricably intentional.
Given (CF) we are in a position to explain the nucleus of all economic activity, interpersonal exchange. We arrive at it once we take two actions reports and intertwine them in a way that what emerges is co-ordinated, co-operative and reciprocal. Thus the proper union of
Tom gives Dick his sheep because Tom wants that Dick gives him his goat and believes that if he gives Dick his sheep Dick will give him his goat
and the corresponding inverse for Dick (call that (TD)) will also be an instance of (CF), albeit one where the agent is the proper union of Tom and Dick (a team), and correspondingly for the respective doings, wants and beliefs involved.
Rivalry enters the scene only if we envisage an alternative exchange (TH), presumably involving Harry’s llama instead of Dick’s goat. However, (TD) and (TH) will only gives us rivalry once we add the missing element of intentionality: Just like two person’s speedily moving in the same direction does not constitute a race unless the one wants to outperform the other, no connection of (TD) and (TH) will constitute rivalry if we fail to take propositional attitudes into account: Dick hopes that (TD) and fears that (TH), and Harry vice versa. Where their so regarding the other as a rival motivates any additional action to ensure that (TD) and not (TH), or vice versa, this is competition. In short: Competition is antagonistic behaviour due to perceiving the other as rival. But importantly: We explained this ultimately in sound and sober terms of action theory and the philosophy of mind only.
The main implication seems to be this: Neither the number of sellers nor any other objective feature of market structure drives competition. The agent’s subjective attitudes do: Fear of losing business and hope for still securing it. So, ultimately, monopolistic competition can hardly be regarded as a market failure in any substantial sense; and, more importantly, most competition policies are up for critical review since they will rest on inadequate a basis. Hence, far from giving reason to tremble for the reputation of anything, philosophical action theory may contribute substantially to economics and the social sciences.
Literatur:
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1995), Explaining Attitudes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brentano, Franz (1874), Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London 1995: Routledge.
Burge, Tyler (2010), Origins of Objectivity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Chamberlin, Edward (1933), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 8th ed., Oxford 1962: Oxford University Press.
Crane, Tim (1998), Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental, in: O’Hear, Anthony (ed.), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 229–251.
Davidson, Donald (1963), Actions, reasons, and causes, in: Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed., Oxford 2001: Clarendon Press, 3–19.
Hintikka, Jaako (1962), Knowledge and belief, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Marshall, Alfred (1890), Principles of economics, 8th ed., London 1920: Macmillan & Co.
Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nagel, Thomas (1979), Subjective and objective, in: Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196–213.
–––––––– (1986), The view from nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Samuelson, Paul (1947), Foundations of economic analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
–––––––– (1964), Theory and Realism: A Reply, American Economic Review 54, 736–739.
Searle, John (1979), What Is an Intentional State? Mind 88, 74-92.
–––––––– (1983), Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stigler, George J. (1957), Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, The Journal ofPolitical Economy 65, 1–17.
–––––––– (2008), Competition, in: Palgrave Macmillan (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Zusätzliche Hinweise zu Prüfungen:
Studienleistungen:
- aktive Teilnahme
- sorgfältige Vor-/Nachbereitung der Seminarsitzung
- erwartet wird die Teilnahme an wöchentlichen Zoom-Meetings, in denen der Seminarstoff besprochen wird
- weitere Studienleistungen werden ggf. am Anfang der Veranstaltung bekannt gegeben
Prüfungsleistung:
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