|
Lehrende: Prof. Dr. Anke Gerber
Veranstaltungsart:
Interaktive Lehrveranstaltung
Anzeige im Stundenplan:
PEP3
Semesterwochenstunden:
3
Credits:
6,0
Unterrichtssprache:
Englisch
Min. | Max. Teilnehmerzahl:
- | 51
Weitere Informationen:
Registration period for first-semester students Mon, 26 October 2020, 9 am to Sun, 01 November 2020, 11:59 pm
Kommentare/ Inhalte:
The theory of social choice and welfare deals with collective decision making and the foundations of welfare economics. The course centers on the question of how a group of individuals, e.g. society, should aggregate individual preferences in order to take decisions. We will analyze the fundamental conflict between different normative criteria which leads to famous impossibility results. Further topics include the strategic manipulation of collective choice rules and distributive justice.
Lernziel:
Students
- know different normative criteria for collective decision making
- understand the conceptual problems in the analysis of distributional justice and welfare
- know the formal methods and main results of social choice theory
- can apply the theory to practical decision problems
Vorgehen:
The online course consists of weekly lectures and bi-weekly interactive sessions, where students present their solutions problem sets.
- Lecture: Every week a presentation of the lecture will be uploaded on Lecture2Go. The lecture slides will also be uploaded in Olat. Every Tuesday, 10.00-10.45 a.m., there will be a live session on Zoom, where students can ask questions about the lecture. Students can also ask questions and discuss the course material with the professor and with other students in the chat in Olat.
- Interactive Sessions: Every other week a problem set will be uploaded in Olat which will be discussed in a live session on Zoom on Monday, 1.00-2.30 p.m. on the dates announced in STiNE. Students are supposed to solve the problem sets before attending the session. They can post questions in the chat in Olat. If needed the professor will provide assistance. Every student has the opportunity to submit a written solution to a problem set once, or, alternatively, to present his or her solution in the session where the problem set is being discussed. The mark for the presentation or written solution can upgrade the mark of the final exam (conditional on pass) by a maximum of 0.7. Further information on the submission of solutions to problem sets will be published in Olat.
Outline of the course
1. Introduction
2. Arrow’s Impossibility Result
3. Escaping Arrow’s Impossibility Result
3.1 Simple Majority Voting
3.2 Scoring Rules
4. The Conflict between Efficiency and Individual Rights
5. Manipulation of Collective Choice Rules
6. Distributive Justice
7. Bargaining Solutions and Social Choice
Literatur:
Textbooks
Arrow, K. J. (2nd. ed. 1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, John Wiley & Sons, New York
Gaertner, W. (2009) A Primer in Social Choice Theory, Oxford University Press, New York (Main Textbook)
Gilboa, I. (2010) Rational Choice, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Kelly, S. K. (1988) Social Choice Theory: An Introduction, Springer, Berlin
Sen, A. K. (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Holden-Day, San Francisco, republished 1979 by North-Holland, Amsterdam
Zusätzliche Hinweise zu Prüfungen:
TAKE-HOME EXAM:
Time to process the exam: 90 min
Time frame in which the exam can be completed: 120 min
First exam: 24.02.2021, 3:30 pm - 5:30 pm
Second exam: 22.03.2021, 3:30 pm - 5:30 pm
The examiner of your course will provide information about the hand out of examination tasks / assignments and their submission.
|
